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Bank Lending and the Transmission
of Monetary Policy
How does monetary policy affect the economy?
According to the conventional view, a change in
monetary policy affects the economy by causing
individuals to alter their holdings of short-term
bank liabilities (money). However, other channels
have been suggested as well, either in addition to
or in place of the conventional channel. Some
recent work has returned to an earlier theme,
emphasizing the role played by bank lending in
this process. If this view is correct, it suggests
that close attention should be paid to bank lend-
ing. For example, it suggests that variables that
alter the ability of banks to make loans-such as
capital requirements or the health of the banking
sector-may alter the efficacy of monetary pol-
icy. This Weekly Letter compares the convene
tional view with the so-called lending view and
discusses the empirical evidence.
The "conventional" view
According to the conventional view, monetary
policy works as follows. To tighten policy, for
example, the Fed sells securities to the public
in exchange for reserves. Because banks must
hold reserves against transactions deposits, a
reduction in available reserves generally means
a reduction in these deposits. To make firms
and households willing to hold more bonds and
fewer transactions balances, the yield on bonds
must rise. Higher interest rates, in turn, serve to
restrain spending on goods and services through-
out the economy. (In the long run lower spending
will lead to a fall in the price level such that
inflation-adjusted money balances rise, and
interest rates fall, to where they were prior to
the tightening.)
According to this view, then, monetary policy
works because there are no perfect substitutes
available for transactions deposits. Individuals are
unwilling to change the quantity of transactions
balances they hold unless the cost of holding
these balances changes. (In this case the cost is
the interest that couId have been earned ifthe
individual held bonds instead of money.) In terms
of bank balance sheets, this view stresses the
liability side, and assumes that there is nothing
special about the asset side. When monetary
policy is tightened (for example), the reduction
in bank assets required to balance the reduction in
deposits is assumed to be costless, essentially be-
cause bank loans are assumed to be no different
from other kinds of loans in the economy.
The lending view
Suppose, instead, that there were something spe-
cial about bank loans. In that case the reduction
in loans required to re-balance bank balance
sheets would have effects in addition to those
caused by higher interest rates. This is the view
put forward by the proponents of the "lending
view." (In the past the lending channel has been
suggested as an alternative to the conventional
channel; most recent discussion suggests that it is
something that works in addition to the conven-
tional channel.) As Bernanke (1993) points out,
the conventional view is overly restrictive since
it assumes that "... currency and bank deposits
[are] the only assets for which there are not per-
fect or nearly perfect substitutes." By contrast,
all other assets are grouped under the general
heading of "bonds." This grouping is clearly
problematic; for instance, it is difficult to argue
that commercial paper issued by General Motors
and the loan carried on a credit card are perfect
substitutes.
What would make bank loans special? One
prominent explanation is that banks have infor-
mation about borrowers that is not easily avail-
able to other lenders. The bank might acquire
such information, for instance, in the course of
repeated dealings with a particular customer.
Since other lenders would not have the same in-
formation, they would be unwilling to step in to
compensate for a (monetary policy induced) re-
duction in lending by banks. Credit constrained
borrowers would then be forced to cut spending.
Firms, for example, might have to reduce employ-
ment or shut down plants.FRBSF
Potential problems
While this view ofthe transmission mechanism is
intuitively plausible, a number of objections have
been raised against it. Some economists have ar-
gued that there is no particular reason for bank
loans to be special. They argue that while there
may be borrowers about whom it is difficult to
acquire information, there is no particular reason
that deposit-taking institutions should be making
loans to these borrowers. Finance companies, for
example, can easily acquire the same informa-
tion and make the same loans. The existence of
alternative institutions willing to make the same
loans means that bank lending is not special,
since companies that are denied loans by banks
can easily turn elsewhere.
Proponents of the lending viev/ have countered
by saying that because banks can easily monitor
the transactions activities of borrowers they are
likely to have an informational advantage over
other lenders. Such an advantage would mean that
banks could provide loans at a lower cost than
other lenders, and bank loans would be special.
Whilebanks could have some sortofinformational
advantage over nonbank lenders, the strength of
any such advantage is still an open question.
Some have also questioned the Fed's ability to
control bank lending through variations in re-
serves. Romer and Romer (1990) point out that,
in addition to issuing transactions deposits, banks
can also raise funds by issuing CDs. Since
banks are no longer required to hold reserves
against CDs, they can respond to a tightening of
monetary policy by issuing fewer transactions
deposits (against which reserves must be held)
and more CDs, while keeping loans constant. If
this were indeed the case, Fed induced variations
in reserves would have little effect on banks'
ability to make loans.
However, this argument assumes that banks
could issue as many CDs as they wanted at pre-
vailing interest rates. !n fact, it is unlikely that
firms and households would be willing to in-
crease CD holdings without being offered some
kind of inducement to do so; specifically, banks
would have to raise the interest rates they offered
on CDs. The cost of making loans would go up
as a consequence, and banks would end up mak-
ing fewer loans than they were making before the
Fed tightening. Thus, while CDs with zero re-
serve requirements make loan volume less sensi-
tive to variations in reserves, loan volume is not
totally immune.
Empirical evidence
A look at the data reveals that the quantity of bank
lending tends to move together with economy-
wide aggregates such as output, employment and
firm inventories. However, this evidence by itself
is not conclusive; such a pattern could be caused
either because changes in the supply of loans
lead to changes in the level of economic activity
or because firms react to changes in economic
activity by changingtheir demand for loans.
One response to such arguments is to try to deter-
mine whether changes in bank lending predict
changes in economic activity. If changes in bank
lending provide achannel through which changes
in monetary policy affect the economy, then
changes in bank lending should be observed to
precede changes in economic activity. \AJhile de-
tecting such patterns can be a subtle matter, em-
pirical studies generally have found little evidence
to support this hypothesis; instead, bank lending
tends to change at about the same time as eco-
nomic activity. This would suggest that bank
lending is not a significant channel for the trans-
mission of monetary policy to the economy.
However, proponents of the lending view have
pointed out that such studies are inappropriate
because the volume of bank loans is difficult to
adjust immediately after a change in policy, and
that banks are likely to react first by reducing the
securities they hold and only later by changing
the amount of loans. While the available evi-
dence is consistent v/ith this hypothesis, the fact
that the quantity ofoutstanding loans falls at the
same time as economic activity also means that
we cannot rule out the possibility that loan de-
mand is falling because of lower levels of activity.
It has also been suggested that some of the ob-
served sluggishness in loan behavior may be the
result of the fact that banks often precommit to
making loans. Here the evidence is somewhat
more favorable to the lending hypothesis; in-
deed, it has been shown that while loans made
under commitment react relatively slowly, loans
made without commitment fall relatively quickly
in response to positive interest rate shocks.
Another way to test this hypothesis is to isolate
the set of borrowers that is likely to be more
dependent upon bank credit and compare the
behavior of these borrowers to others who are not
as dependent upon banks. Under the lending
view a tightening of monetary policy would
cause banks to cut down lending to all borrow-ers; however, small firms would find it difficult
to obtain credit from other sources, while large
firms would find it easier to go and borrow else-
where. Consistent with this hypothesis, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1991) find that the sales of small
firms are more sensitive to changes in interest
rates and to certain constructed measures of
monetary policy.
More problematic for the lending hypothesis is
their finding that bank lending to large firms ac-
tually tends to increase in response to positive
interest rate shocks, while lending to small firms
falls. Since small borrowers are unable to borrow
elsewhere while large firms find iteasier to move,
one would expect that monetary policy tighten-
ing would lead to relatively more bank lending
to small firms. The contradictory finding suggests
that the decline in lending has more to do with
the special characteristics of small firms (small
firms may be more likely to fail in a recession, for
example) than with the way in which monetary
policy affects the economy.
A tentative assessment
As our selective review of recent research indi-
cates, the available evidence offers only mixed
support to the lending hypothesis. Yet this does
not mean that we should dismiss this hypothesis
out of hand. On an a priori basis, the hypothe-
sis appears plausible. While the financial system
is evolving, at least at this point in time there
seem to bea substantial numberofborrowers who
find it difficultto goelsewhere when denied lend-
ingby banks. Italso is difficulttobelievethatbanks
can isolate lending completely from changes in
the stance of monetary policy. Empirically, the
issue seems to be whether the lending channel is
important enough to matter once the effects of
the conventional channel are allowed for.
Determining the strength ofthis channel is im-
portant. Kashyap and Stein (1993) point out that
the existence of a lending channel implies that
factors affecting bank lending are likely to have
an influence on the effectiveness of monetary
policy. The example they present has to do with
the capital requirements that banks are subject to
when making loans. Suppose, for example, that
banks do not have enough capital to make new
loans. In such a situation they will be unable to
make new loans even after the Fed eases policy.
Consequently, the easing of policy will have a
smaller effect than it would if banks were not
constrained by capital requirements. Kashyap
and Stein suggest that this may help explain why
many people considered monetary policy to be
relatively ineffectual during the 1990-1991 reces-
sion; in other words, it might explain why the
economy has not grown robustly even after pol-
icy eased. While this is not much more than con-
jecture at this point, it does illustrate why the
existence and strength of such a channel may be
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